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ABSTRACT 
 
DESANTIS, ANTHONY A.     An Economic Analysis of the Rise in Franchise Values in 
the Four Major North American Sports Leagues From 2008-2016. 
 Department of Economics, March 2018. 
 
ADVISOR: Stephen J. Schmidt 
 
North American professional sports franchise values have been growing rapidly 
over the last 10 years, leading some to wonder how this rise might mirror previous 
economic booms such as those of the internet and housing sectors, and thus impact the 
future of the sport industry. To investigate this phenomenon, financial and other team-
specific data was acquired from Forbes, while metropolitan area statistics were mostly 
gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census. The results of this 
study showed that revenue, metropolitan area population and GDP, multiple teams in the 
same metro area and the same league, and year that a venue opened (or was renovated) 
have a significant effect on team value. Additionally, a large “bubble” in team prices for 
2016 was evident throughout, helping explain the drastic rise in prices since 2014. 
Revenue, metroGDP, and year=2016 were all positively correlated with franchise value, 
while metroteamssame, metropop, and venueyropened were all negatively correlated Since 
professional sports is a private industry, the bubble is most likely driven by external factors 
such as the rise in TV and broadcasting revenue, and thus does not seem to be in danger of 
bursting. As such, it will be interesting to see how new TV deals increase these valuations 
even further. Additionally, one can theorize how recent and forthcoming sales transactions 
might continue to “set the market” higher and higher, as typically occurs in other industries 
throughout the economy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 1.1: Research Question and Answer 
This paper aims to prove how market demographics like metropolitan area income 
and population, and financial statistics such as revenue and player expenses can be 
determinants of the rise in North American professional sports franchise values over the 
last 10 years. 
As the analysis below will show, a franchise’s revenue, the population and GDP of 
the metropolitan area in which it plays, having more than one team from the same league 
in the same metro area, and the year in which a team’s venue opened are the factors that 
are statistically significant and correlated to its overall rise in value over the last 10 years. 
Even though revenue prevails as the primary factor causing the large rise in value over this 
time period, it is not large enough to explain the drastic spike in values more specifically 
between 2014-2016. Even after controlling for revenue, team valuations in 2016 are still 
$312 million higher than they would have been with the same revenue and other factors in 
earlier years. As such, these findings support the idea that an economic bubble might be 
present in the sports industry, with values far exceeding their true expected range. Given 
this information, along with the theory that the bubble is most likely driven by external 
factors such as TV and broadcasting revenue and ever-climbing real transaction prices, it 
can be expected that these values continue to rise exponentially in the near future.  
Section 1.2: Research Motives 
Sports economics has commanded a greater share of attention from economists 
around the world since the early 1990s, and even more so over the past 15-20 years. While 
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topics have ranged from the impact of free agency to labor issues to team nomenclature, 
one specific area of interest that has yet to be fully developed is the impact of factors such 
as costs, revenue, and metropolitan demographics on a franchise’s estimated value. This 
topic has come into even greater focus over the last decade as team values across the four 
major North American sports leagues (NFL, MLB, NBA, NHL) have skyrocketed, with 
little economic reasoning or theory to explain such a drastic rise. Forbes has estimated 
these franchise values using its own formulas and economic data, providing further 
evidence behind this growing trend. Additionally, over this same time period real 
transaction prices for teams throughout the four leagues have increased exponentially as 
well, most times even exceeding the estimated value as calculated by Forbes.  
This phenomenon is especially interesting to study as the sports industry has shown 
fluctuations in value in response to various economic factors and events as well. Some 
team values decreased between 2008-2012 as the U.S. endured The Great Recession and 
subsequent long period of recovery. On the other end of the spectrum, the largest increase 
in franchise values has occurred since 2014 – the same time during which the economy has 
boomed and the stock market has flourished. These similar trends between the U.S. 
macroeconomy and the sports industry might suggest a greater correlation between a firm’s 
finances and its overall value than previously thought, as well as provide the potential 
underlying theory of an economic bubble that franchises have witnessed more recently, as 
seen during the technology boom of the late-1990s and the housing bubble of the mid-
2000s. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BCKGROUND ON THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS INDUSTRY 
Section 2.1: Overview of North American Professional Sports History 
With a rise in popularity and the growing importance of sports economics and 
sports money, the North American professional sports industry has become increasingly 
more interesting to study in the last 20-30 years. Unlike publicly traded companies, sports 
franchises are almost all completely privately owned (with the exception of the Green Bay 
Packers – whose public offerings occur very rarely and come with almost none of the 
benefits of owning traditional stock). However, these franchises operate much in the same 
ways that public companies operate, with values ultimately derived from the return on 
capital investment in them, among many other factors. As such, changes in value are often 
reflected by stock market swings, and other economic, political, and social events that 
shock the economy. The sports industry survived The Great Depression, and more recently 
the impact that The Great Recession had on sponsorship and attendance revenues to 
continue on the path towards reaching the peak in value seen today (Van Riper, 2008). This 
statement implies that the main factor that differentiates the professional sports industry 
from many others is its ability to keep growing even in business cycle downturns. Even so, 
while this privatized nature suggests that underlying factors must play a role in the overall 
valuation, in the end a sports franchise is still a business like any other, and so the usual 
tools of valuing businesses should apply to it in a similar sense.  
The rest of this chapter will discuss the history of the four different professional 
sports leagues in order to provide background knowledge on important events that have 
fostered the development of each to reach where they are today. Part of this history acts as 
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the foundation upon which these leagues have grown to become integral pieces of both 
society and the economy. Without changes such as free agency, advertising revenue, 
westward expansion, and many others, one could hypothesize that team values would never 
have reached the heights they are at today. Additionally, more recent history provides the 
motivation behind this paper, as evidence exists behind the idea that various factors have 
contributed to the rapid rise in valuations. One specific piece of evidence that will be 
studied in even greater detail is the potential formation of a “bubble” in the industry since 
2014. Although the analytical portion of this study will group the four major North 
American sports leagues into one for simplicity of regression analysis, it is easier to first 
understand the growth of each league individually before then bringing all of these ideas 
back together as it pertains to the model, results, and conclusion. 
Section 2.2: History of Major League Baseball 
 Professional sports gained immense popularity in the United States and Canada 
following World War II. During this same time period the current formation of the MLB, 
NFL, NBA, and NHL slowly evolved as the leagues “progressively found ways to deal 
with long-standing issues such as franchise relocations and nationwide expansion, conflict 
with interlopers, limiting player salaries, racial integration, and many others that threatened 
to hinder the expected growth” (Reiss, 2017). While Major League Baseball has long been 
known as America’s pastime, this distinction has not come without scrutiny. Financial 
woes were long a problem for many MLB teams, only to be resolved in the mid-20th 
century with the game expanding to the West Coast, as well as aid from rapidly rising 
attendance and the introduction of TV broadcasting (Reiss 2017).  
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Along with this relocation and expansion came the construction of new ballparks. 
In those early days, many teams secured public financing for these venues by claiming 
them as multi-purpose venues, while more present-day stadiums embrace the look and feel 
of the technological innovation revolution of today’s age that precedes increased private 
financing and sole ownership. Additionally, the formation of the player’s union in 1954 
was a moment that forever changed the course of baseball history, although its true impact 
was not felt until the late 1960s and early 1970s by fighting for improved player benefits 
and salaries, and eventually free agency (Reiss, 2017). No longer under the strict rules of 
ownership, free agency is arguably the driving force behind the exponential rise in player 
salaries that is seen today. Through multiple labor strikes and plateauing attendance, Major  
Figure 1: Average MLB Team Valuation 2008-2016 
 
*Data comes from Forbes 
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League Baseball has continued to grow in the 21st century due to higher ticket prices and 
increased TV revenues, thanks in large part to arguably the strongest labor union in North 
America. A more detailed representation of recent MLB team values that precedes the 
regression analysis to follow can be seen in Figure 1 above, which shows average forecast 
sales values since 2008. In particular, it is interesting to note the 59% average increase in 
team value between 2014-2016, indicating the potential for some external factor affecting 
these valuations beyond the measured variables that Forbes already uses in its calculation. 
Section 2.3: History of the National Football League 
 Similar to Major League Baseball, the NFL made great strides in its national 
appeal through westward expansion and merging with the American Football League. 
Likewise, the formation of the NFL Players Association in 1956 eventually gave rise to 
free agency, though unlike in MLB, with a hard salary cap that restricts player salaries to 
a maximum dollar value (Reiss 2017). Many would argue that football has surpassed 
baseball as America’s pastime as the NFL has the most teams of any professional league 
and a growing fan base both domestically and internationally. Much of this growth into 
the 21st century can also be attributed to league-wide TV and broadcast revenues – by far 
the largest among any of the sports leagues. However, as the league seeks to continue to 
thrive in the coming decades, it is challenged by two important matters: an increased 
social divide between players and society, and the fallback of years of concussions and 
other playing-related health issues that threaten the league’s profits, reputation, and 
future. More recent trends in NFL estimated average team value can be seen in Figure 2 
below, which shows a staggering 64% increase in value between 2014-2016 – exceeding 
that of Major League Baseball teams over the same time period. 
   7 
Figure 2: Average NFL Team Valuation 2008-2016 
 
*Data comes from Forbes 
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Figure 3: Average NBA Team Valuation 2008-2016 
 
*Data comes from Forbes 
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entire league for nearly three decades (Reiss 2017). While the NHL has seen steady but 
slow growth since, many external factors have caused it to lag behind other North 
American professional sports leagues. Since many of its players immigrate from overseas 
countries, the NHL has had to embrace this diversity by conforming to Olympic and other 
national team demands, which typically fall in the middle of the season.  
Additionally, a lack of union structure hindered growth during the late 20th century 
– a time when other leagues prospered. During this same time period relocation and 
expansion were abundant, but with little success – especially in the southern part of the 
U.S, a warmer climate with minimal hockey appeal and a history deeply rooted in the other 
three leagues. Lacking the same national engagement of the other three sports, the NHL  
Figure 4: Average NHL Team Valuation 2008-2016 
 
*Data comes from Forbes 
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clearly trails the MLB NFL, and NBA in terms of current popularity and growth as 
evidenced by average franchise values over the last 10 years seen in Figure 4 above. This 
is especially true considering NHL teams did not exhibit the same trend of drastic growth 
since 2014 with only an 11% value gain on average, compared to the 59%, 64%, and 96% 
seen in the MLB, NFL, and NBA respectively. Whatever factors may be driving the growth 
in the other three leagues do not seem to be having the same effect in the National Hockey 
League, which supports the theory that each league operates independently and reacts 
differently than the others. 
Section 2.6: Current and Future Sports Market Data 
As of 2014, Forbes valued the current North American professional sports market 
at $60.5 billion, with it expected to reach $73.5 billion by 2019 (Heitner, 2015). Along 
these same lines, it is expected that revenue from media rights deals – especially in the 
NBA, NHL, and NBA where current contracts expire in 2019 – will surpass gate revenues 
as the industry’s largest income segment. The underlying economics here is that franchise 
values should rise when they receive more TV revenue, under the assumption that revenue 
shows as significant and positively correlated with team value.  
The accompanying sports market history and projections that previously supported 
this position can be seen in Figure 5 below. The largest increases in market-associated 
revenue between 2010-2014 occurred in both media rights and sponsorship, with gate 
revenues and merchandising trailing slightly behind in terms of gains. In particular, media 
rights climbed 15.2% from 2010-20111, and 19% between 2013-20142. The 2015-2019 
                                               
1 NFL signed TV deals worth $27 billion, and NHL new 10 year deal, in 2011. 
2 NBA signed new $24 billion deal with Turner in 2014, expected to begin during 2016-
17 season 
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Figure 5: North American Sports Market History and Projections 
  
projections support the current data to continue this trend as well, with projected CAGR 
returns of 7.2% and 4.5% for media rights and sponsorship respectively. Expected year-
over-year changes for this same time period remain relatively steady as well, with media 
rights expected to fall to more normalized levels after the jump associated with the latest 
NBA television deal. Given these rapid changes along with the overall evolution of the 
sports industry, there is great anticipation about how this continued growth nationally will 
contribute to the paralleled rise in franchise valuation. 
Section 2.7: Theory of an Economic Bubble 
 As seen with the rapid rise of estimated values between 2014-2016 in the NBA, 
MLB, and NFL, evidence suggests that this increase might be explainable by the theory of 
an economic bubble. An economic bubble can be defined as a rapid rise in the market prices 
of an asset so far beyond its fundamental value that it can be considered an ‘irrational 
exuberance’ (Investopedia 2017). In technical terms, a bubble occurs when there are too 
many buyers who are too keen to buy and not enough supply, and thus prices get driven up 
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extremely quickly. This can especially be true in an industry such as professional sports in 
which there is a minimal number of firms compared to a typical market, and these firms 
are not sold very often. Additionally, the fact that teams are often sold through a closed-
bidding process pushes these prices up even further. Once one team sets the sale price high 
in a particular sport, others are more likely to follow in the future. 
 Contemporary examples of an economic bubble support these assumptions. The 
technology rise of the 1990s gave way to the dotcom bubble the formed and eventually 
burst at the turn of the century as the economy could not handle the rapid rise in equity 
markets fueled by investments in internet-based companies. The bubble formed as a result 
of an influx of cheap money, easy capital, market overconfidence, and pure speculation. 
However, the companies that investors hedged their bets on failed to turn a profit, and 
eventually the market crashed as many of the companies declared bankruptcy and folded 
(Investopedia, 2016). Even more recently, the housing bubble and subsequent Great 
Recession in 2008 shook the economy in ways that economists had never seen before. 
Partly fueled by the decreased investment in stocks following the dotcom bubble, investors 
instead began purchasing real estate, driving up home prices across the country. However, 
as time went on and prices continued to rise, these investments became more speculative 
and the mortgages subprime until eventually homeowners defaulted, leaving banks and 
institutions deprived of cash and capital (Investopedia 2017). What both of these events 
have in common is the idea of speculative investment and greater demand than supply 
rapidly increases prices – something that can be applied to many firms in many different 
industries, even a professional sports team. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
The history of growth in the professional sports industry is especially interesting to 
study as it relates to specific factors that may be affecting the exponential rise in franchise 
valuation seen more recently – especially in the MLB, NBA, and NFL. Since these changes 
cannot be attributed to specific macroeconomic variables or events, they must come from 
other internal and external causes that are directly related to a specific franchise and its 
corresponding market. Previous studies have sought to build upon this historical 
knowledge by testing the correlation between many of these factors as it relates to the 
increased franchise valuation across all four sports leagues. Much of this previous analysis 
originally focused on the impact of facility construction and franchise relocation since it 
was theoretically assumed throughout the industry that these factors increased the value of 
a franchise and provided a positive externality to the surrounding city. Similarly, more 
recent economists have further developed these ideas by questioning the importance of 
team ownership, public vs. private funding of these new facilities, and the impact of 
different pricing schemes, given that professional sports is a private industry and thus 
financial statements are difficult to find. However, where this topic lacks analysis and 
understanding – but provides an opportunity for additional research – is in this cross-
relationship between underlying financials, market demographics, and franchise valuation, 
and the potential economic reasoning behind both this rise in value as well as the decision-
making determinants for potential investors in overvaluing a team during the bidding 
process.  
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Section 3.1: Real Transaction Price and Economic Models 
 One way in which economists have approached the topic of professional sports 
franchise values is by looking at real transaction prices and how economic models can 
predict such values. While these models are imperfect in determining specific factors that 
may impact the sale price, they do a great job of examining the impact of the market 
structure of the professional sports industry as a whole, especially as it pertains to various 
microeconomic theories. 
One of the distinct characteristics of a professional sports league compared to other 
industries is the fact that there are industry-wide cooperative behaviors among teams with 
some degree of antitrust exemption. Given this assumption, Bae and Choi (2007) analyzed 
the optimal number of firms in a professional sports league using Salop’s circular city 
model under two different assumptions. One assumption was a cartel with full collusion 
that has absolute control over the number of firms as well as their pricing, and the other 
was a semi-collusive cartel that controls the number of firms, but pricing is independently 
determined by each firm in a non-cooperative manner. Although this study would not seem 
to have a direct relationship to firm value, in a deeper sense the number of firms in a league 
– or more specifically, in a single market – can potentially be a determining factor in overall 
team value. As it relates to my study below, I have variables that measure competition 
between franchises between firms and its effect on profits. However, in this scenario the 
authors assumed that a professional sports league acts as the cartel that coordinates the 
number of teams and possibly ticket pricing as well. 
 In modeling this cartel collusion, the authors used the location of consumers in the 
circular city model as a representation of their fan loyalties for an ideal team. After 
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analyzing this model under three scenarios: a cartel with full collusion, a semi-collusive 
cartel without price control, and free entry, the authors found that each scenario had its own 
advantages and drawbacks in relation to a professional sports league. The semi-collusive 
cartel provided a smaller number of firms than the fully collusive cartel because the 
inability to control prices forces it to relax price competition. As for North American sports 
leagues, since they operate as a semi-collusive cartel, the number of franchises must come 
close to the socially optimal number in order to maximize benefits for both the consumer 
and the firm. However, this analysis also concluded by stating that any policy related to 
the number of franchises should be evaluated with greater care because they depend on the 
extent to which the leagues can control franchisees’ pricing behavior – an important note 
for future studies on this topic. As it relates to overall franchise market value and the effect 
of franchise location on this value, it is important to consider the number of teams in a 
specific market – and even multiple teams from the same league in the same market – as 
potentially correlated variables.  
 Due to the fact that financials of professional sports franchises are difficult to obtain 
since they operate as private firms, Humphreys and Mondello (2008) aimed to predict the 
determinants of franchise values using a Hedonic Price Model. A Hedonic Price Model 
identifies factors according to the premise that price is determined both by internal 
characteristics of the good being sold and external factors affecting it. The authors built off 
of previous studies from the likes of Alexander and Kern (2004), Vine (2004), Fort (2006), 
and Miller (2007), except with a further analysis of the impact of intangible assets and 
fundamental determinants beyond the typical tangible ones such as stadiums and capital 
resources. 
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 In this study the authors used the hedonic price index method to analyze the prices 
paid for professional sports franchises based on their estimated value according to the 
observable characteristics of their assets. The data for this study came from Rod Fort’s 
Business Data website, BEA, and ballparks.com. However, compared to previous studies, 
the authors here used actual franchise sale prices from the period 1969-2006 rather than 
the estimated values given by Financial World and Forbes Magazine. 
 The results of this study indicated that the average price of NFL franchises is the 
highest, followed by MLB and NBA which are equal, and NHL which are the lowest. It is 
found that franchises in larger markets command a premium, while the population 
parameter suggested that for each additional 1% increase in metro area population the 
franchise sales price increases by 0.67%. Both of these ideas are ones that I will consider 
in my analysis, though using the estimated value rather than actual sale prices during initial 
regressions. For all sales since 1990, when Financial World started publishing estimated 
team values, the estimated value averages $31.6 million less than the actual sale price. 
While previous analysis would suggest that this difference stems from on-field success and 
facility age, this hedonic price model does not support these findings. There also may be a 
correlation between sale value and multiple franchises competing in the same study, though 
further analysis of this variable must be done before reaching a conclusion. Lastly, the 
average annual rate of increase of this index was over 20% for the period 1969-2006, 
signifying owners earned significant capital gain over this period – and potentially a reason 
why owners are willing to pay far above the estimated value. While the results of this 
analysis were limited in scope since the hedonic price model depends critically on a 
specified model and does not account for cross-league effects of changes in sale prices, 
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these shortcomings also represent opportunities for further research on intangible variables 
in the future. 
As suggested at the end of his previous research on factors that affect actual sale 
prices in professional sports, Humphreys and Lee (2010) aimed to price models on 
franchise value by using the repeat sales method and a hybrid model that includes both 
repeat sales and single transactions rather than a hedonic price model. Originally used for 
calculating changes in the sales price of the same piece of real estate over time, the authors 
used this method to instead analyze the change in franchise sales prices from one sale to 
the next to account for the hedonic characteristics of franchise prices. The rationale behind 
performing this research was to build upon previous theories of the effects of observable 
variables such as transaction prices, markets teams play in, and facilities teams play, as 
well as provide an offset for hedonic shortcomings in unobservable variables related to 
perceived quality of a franchise due to reputation, city status, and other intangible benefits. 
 As with Humphreys’ previous study, data came from Rodney Fort’s Sports 
Business Data website, though this time franchise sale prices were evaluated over the time 
period 1960-2009. The results of this study showed some interesting features not seen in 
previous studies. While the repeat sales method showed great fluctuation in the correlation 
of sales prices on a year-to-year basis, over the long term there was no apparent upward 
trend in the index. The trend line for this data rose incrementally over the first 30 years 
before reaching a peak in the 1990s and then declining at the turn of the century. However, 
when accounting for single sales in the hybrid model, an entirely different appeared.  The 
results of the hybrid model showed incremental increases over the first 30 years but then a 
substantial increase in franchise values that began in the early 1990s and continued into the 
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2000s. The only positively significant variable present in both of these models was 
population.  
 In comparing both of Humphreys’ studies, it is important to note four possible 
reasons for observed differences in prices between his hedonic, repeat sales, and hybrid 
models: (1) some important characteristics of each franchise changed between transactions, 
while the repeat sales method assumes these remain unchanged, (2) the prices of hedonic 
attributes change over time, while the repeat sales approach holds them constant, (3) the 
franchises that are bought and sold in the sample are not representative of the entire 
population of franchises, and (4) the hedonic and hybrid approaches miss-specify the 
functional form of the model and omit important hedonic characteristics. 
 As previously stated, the repeat sales method showed no significant upward trend 
over time. Essentially, changes in the quality of individual franchises appear to drive 
increases in the value of professional sports franchises. However, the upward trend – 
especially in the 1990s and early 2000s – seen in the hybrid model suggested that the main 
factors associated with franchise quality and value are market income and population, 
facility characteristics, and on-field success. The difference in these results provides room 
for further investigation into the effects of market-related factors, especially when 
considering actual financials provided from Forbes rather than estimated prices using 
theoretical economic models. 
Section 3.2: Franchise Values Determined by Financial World and Forbes 
 Another way in which economists have approached this topic more recently is by 
looking at the impact of various internal and external factors on a team’s value as calculated 
by Financial World and Forbes. Since both companies began estimating team values at the 
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beginning of the 21st century, economists used this data, along with other factors readily 
available to them such as relocation, venue data, team nomenclature, and other 
metropolitan area statistics to estimate which factors were positively correlated with the 
overall rise in team values. 
 Given the vast evolution and developments across the professional sports landscape 
in the years and decades leading up their research, Alexander and Kern (2004) decided to 
examine the effects of team nomenclature, team relocation, and new stadiums on franchise 
values across the four major professional sports. In particular, the authors aimed to examine 
the economic incentives motivating team relocation and new stadium construction from 
the standpoint of managerial efficiency. They use a payoff strategy to determine the value 
that each of these changes provides to the individual firm or team rather than the economy 
as a whole.  
 In evaluating the effect that team nomenclature (whether a team takes the name of 
its metropolitan area or its state) has on franchise value, Alexander and Kern treated each 
of the four leagues separately since each has different rules and customs which may affect 
that economic value. A major emphasis to support this distinction is revenue sharing – 
whether through ticket sales, broadcast revenue, team luxury tax revenue sharing, or other. 
An interesting feature found in collecting the data was that different teams in the same 
location – and even in the same city – have adopted regional identities, such as teams from 
Minnesota, Colorado, Tampa Bay, New Jersey, Florida, and others. In each of these 
scenarios the reasons behind such a nomenclature can be explained from trying to 
differentiate itself from another adjacent large city (New Jersey vs New York) or in smaller 
market trying to capture fans from a larger radius (St. Paul vs Minnesota). There is also 
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very little evidence of teams changing names while remaining in the same city, while 
relocation or expansion presents an opportunity to change an identity and thus establish a 
new fan base. 
 The empirical model used by Alexander and Kern consists of a pooled, cross-
sectional, time-series panel of team for teams from each of the four major professional 
sports leagues from 1991-1997. Franchise value for each team acts as the dependent 
variable, with data for these values coming from Financial World magazine. It is 
interesting to note that the authors also compared the estimated value to the prices paid for 
various franchises sold during this time period, and found that the estimates were typically 
lower than the transaction prices – though this could reflect the “winners curse” in bidding 
competition for a franchise (Scully, 1995). This economic theory is one of the drawbacks 
of my own study because the estimated values from Forbes are not real sales values, and 
they differ systematically. Continuing with this study, however, independent variables in 
the model included: per-capita income, city population, previous season final standings, 
regional identity, new facility or not (built in 1990 or later), change in franchise location, 
change in team nomenclature, and expansion team. 
 The empirical results generally confirmed the author’s hypotheses. Market size, 
team performance, and the presence of a new facility were all positively correlated to 
franchise value. On the other hand, team relocation, new stadiums, and regional identities 
had little-to-no effect on franchise values, though this can be attributed to increased costs 
and revenues of such changes, as previously studied by Noll and Zimbalist (1997) and 
Hamilton and Khan (1997). Two interesting ideas for future research that Alexander and 
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Kern touch on only briefly is the interaction of regional identity with population, as well 
as whether a regional vs. city identity has any effect on a franchise’s economic value.  
 Although various economists had studied the effects of stadium construction and 
the type of financing involved on franchise values, Miller (2007) wanted to modernize this 
analysis with a specific approach to Major League Baseball – a league in which many 
teams drastically upgraded facilities at the turn of the 21st century. While many of these 
past studies concluded that the benefits of the new stadium to both the team and the 
surrounding market did not outweigh the construction and other external costs, the author 
challenged these ideals with the hypothesis that a new stadium will increase the franchise 
value of teams regardless of how construction was financed due to the increased value 
involved with the capital investment.  
 Building off previous analysis, including that from Alexander and Kern (2004), this 
study examined the effect of private financing for new stadiums on team franchise values 
and measured the impact of the age of a team’s home stadium on its franchise value – a 
more accurate measure of the “newness” of the facility. All of this helped explain the 
determinants of franchise values and the lobbying efforts of team owners in seeking public 
subsidies for construction. Independent variables tested for projected correlation with 
market value included: metropolitan statistical area, per capita income, population (as 
controls), winning percentage for current and previous year, and age stadium. The data for 
this model, obtained from various sources for both ballpark and market information, 
covered MLB teams during the period 1990-2002. 
 The empirical results of this model suggested that a 1% increase in population 
increases team franchise values by between .09 and .12. In dollar terms, a team valued at 
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$200,000,000 would see a $200,000 rise in value corresponding to this 15 increase in 
population. Additionally, in regards to winning percentage, current year’s team quality is 
more important in terms of franchise value growth than last year’s team quality. As far as 
the impact of the stadium, a team playing in a brand-new stadium realizes an increase in 
its franchise value. A team playing in its own stadium has a higher value than a team 
playing in a public stadium, though the differences are not substantial enough to support 
the increased costs of constructing a new private stadium. Also, a team playing in a 
privately financed and owned stadium experiences an increase in value over time, while a 
team playing in a publicly owned and financed stadium sees its value fall over time as the 
stadium ages. While these results provide a good indication of whether or not a team will 
finance the construction of a new stadium, it suggests that in determining the impact of 
stadium construction on franchise values, private funding is the best alternative to public 
funding or no funding at all in both the short- and long-run. 
 Building upon his previous research on private financing and franchise values in 
Major League Baseball, Miller (2009) expanded this study to include specific variables 
such as facility age and ownership on team franchise values. Given prior background 
knowledge about the relationship between private firms and capital investments, the author 
hypothesized that if a team owns its playing facility, it capitalizes the value of the facility 
in the team franchise value, thus driving the value higher. This would back previous work 
done by Alexander and Kern (2004) as well as by Miller (2007), while also supporting the 
motives behind such investment projects and ownership decisions. The empirical model in 
this analysis accounted for franchise valuation as it depended on variables such as winning 
percentage for previous and current year, facility age, and ownership status of the facility, 
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while controlling factors of population, income, and number of seasons in a city for other 
external factors that could affect results. 
 The author found that local per-capita income was positively correlated with a rise 
in franchise value, while population was not. Team quality mattered more in lower revenue 
leagues such as the NBA and NHL than it did in the NFL. As for the initial hypothesis, the 
author found evidence for facility capitalization in the MLB, NHL, and NFL but not in the 
NBA. Economically speaking, it is more valuable for teams in each of those three leagues 
to own its own stadium or facility in order to capitalize on the value it brings to the 
franchise. This can have major implications on public vs. private financing of future 
stadiums, the rate at which facilities are built, and the overall economic impact that a new 
facility could have not only on the franchise valuation, but on the surrounding metro area 
as well. 
 While much of the previous research and analysis on determinants of professional 
sports firm values focused solely on North American teams, this study by Scelles et. al 
(2013) pulled in the international aspect of European soccer as well. While the major 
distinction between the North American sports industry and the European one is based on 
private vs. public ownership, in recent years North American firms have begun to adopt 
aspects of the European model of professional sports: a transition from the traditional to 
the contemporary with less emphasis on gate receipts, subsidies, and sponsors, and greater 
emphasis on vertical integration through a corporate structure that promotes maximizing 
merchandising and TV revenues. The major question that the authors considered 
throughout the analysis was: Does the comparison of the determinants of professional 
sports firm values in North America and Europe contribute to a better understanding of the 
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differences between American and European models? (Though inherently different, they 
are slowly becoming ever-closer in both style and approach). In order to answer this 
question, the authors used an empirical model and regression analysis with franchise value 
as the independent variable and dependent variables such as city population and income, 
facility age, and sports performance measured from 0-6 (not making playoffs to winning a 
championship title). As with previous studies, data for this analysis came from Forbes, 
BEA, Statistics Canada, Eurostat and Population Data, among others. 
 While the results from this regression indicated that franchise income had a 
significantly positive impact for European soccer and not for any American sports, this can 
also suggest that it is more important to be in a league that generates high revenues (and 
thus high revenue sharing) than in an area where population incomes are high. Population 
and attendance were positively significant throughout the four major North American 
sports. Facility age was negatively correlated in the NFL and European soccer, not at all in 
the NBA, and positively in MLB and the NHL – most likely due to historical value placed 
on antique stadiums and ballparks. Private ownership was positively significant throughout 
except for the NBA, while sports performance was positive in the NBA and soccer but 
nowhere else. In all, there were major differences between the North American and 
European sports industries except for private ownership and historical sports performance. 
 My study will specifically build on these earlier findings. While previous authors 
estimated the impact of more qualitative variables such as team nomenclature, on-field 
performance, and venue age on a franchise’s value, they did not have access to quantitative 
data such as a team’s revenue, costs, and other market-related factors. As such, much of 
this analysis will focus on how financial and numerical data – both within the team as well 
   25 
as within the metropolitan area market – may contribute to the recent rise in franchise 
valuation, and how it might be a good indicator of the future of the professional sports 
industry as a whole. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA 
Section 4.1: Forbes Dataset 
A majority of the data comes from Forbes, as the company provided five years’ 
worth of data on every team in each of the four major North American sports leagues. This 
dataset includes many variables such as Forbes’s calculation of estimated team value, costs, 
revenues, ticket sales, and more than fifteen other associated factors. Rather than receive 
five consecutive years, such as 2012-2016, I instead use alternating years from 2008-2016. 
Although this may cause a greater standard error over a broader range, I want greater 
variance in the independent variables, which is more important to control for. Additionally, 
with the exponential rise in valuation coming over the last decade, I thought it would be 
more appropriate to analyze these factors according to this longer time period of increased 
value – rather than just focus on the last five years – with the hope that it will provide a 
more realistic depiction of economic and market trends, and thus better overall results. 
Lastly, all of the variables that Forbes provided are fit with five years of data with the 
exception of four: Debt-to-value %, Gate Receipts, Revenue per Fan, and Average ticket 
price, which only have observations for 2016 because that is when the company started 
collecting information on these variables, and thus they will not be included in any of the 
regressions. 
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Section 4.2: Forbes’s Value Determination 
 Forbes calculates this estimated team value using a cost-revenue analysis. Forbes 
gathers this data from the teams, any public documents, sports bankers, credit rating 
agencies, network executives, and media experts (Forbes Methodology, 2016). Revenue is 
the value of the team based on current stadium deal3 without deduction for debt4. Operating 
income is net of stadium revenues used for debt service. Additionally, revenue from non-
sport events such as concerts or tours in included only when the revenue is pocketed by the 
team owner or an entity the owner controls. The overall team value is then calculated as 
the enterprise value5 based on the multiple of revenue of historical transactions, as well as 
current offers to buy and invest in the teams. These values are then adjusted – to the extent 
that the change in economics is understood and applicable – for teams moving into new 
stadiums. Additionally, this valuation often coincides with the sum of four different 
segments that are attributable to the franchise value: sport, market, stadium, and brand. 
Sport is the portion of the franchise’s value attributable to revenue shared among all teams. 
Market is the portion of franchise’s value attributable to its city and market size. Stadium 
is the portion of a franchise’s value attributable to its stadium, and likewise brand is the 
portion of a franchise’s value attributable to its brand. 
 Other variables that Forbes uses in estimating a team’s value also have specific 
characteristics to take note of. EBIT is as economically defined – earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Debt/value includes stadium debts, player expenses 
includes benefits and bonuses, and gate receipts includes club seats. Win-to-player cost 
                                               
3 Unless a new stadium is pending 
4 Other than annual stadium debt 
5 Calculated as equity plus net debt 
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ratio compares the number of wins per player payroll relative to the rest of the league. 
Playoff wins count twice as much as regular season wins. A score of 120 means that the 
team achieved 20% more victories per dollar of payroll compared with the league average 
during the given season. Lastly, revenue per fan is calculated as local revenues divided by 
metro population with populations in two-team markets divided in half, and the annualized 
change is defined as the current team value compared with the latest transaction price. 
Section 4.3: Other Data and Variables Collected 
The rest of the data for this regression analysis comes from a variety of different 
sources. Metropolitan area populations for all teams in the United States came from the 
U.S. Census Bureau while populations for teams in Canada came from Statistics Canada. 
Metropolitan area GDP for all U.S. teams was acquired from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. GDP data for Canadian teams was taken from Statistics Canada as well, and then 
converted to USD by multiplying the GDP value by the purchasing power parity value 
between the USD and the Canadian dollar. To then calculate the metropolitan are per-capita 
income, the metro area GDP was divided by the metro area population. Additionally, 
various other data such as historical purchase data and prices, relocation dates, venue 
changes, and others were collected from the affiliated websites for each of the four leagues, 
their corresponding hall of fame web pages, and Wikipedia. 
I added other variables that were thought to potentially be correlated with a rise in franchise 
values were added to the dataset for regression analysis as well. MetroTeams accounts for 
multiple teams across the four leagues belonging to the same metro area, and is assigned a 
value, 1-9, based on the total number of teams in that area. Similarly, MetroTeamsSame is 
assigned a value 1-3 to tell whether there are multiple teams from the same league in the 
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same metropolitan area.6 YrPurchased indicated the last year in which a team was 
purchased, and PricePaid tells how much that team was sold for. These variables are 
especially useful in comparing recent real transaction prices to estimated values for further 
analysis. The venue variables, VenueYrOpened, VenueCap, and VenueCost correspond to 
the when a team opened (or renovated) a venue, how many people it holds, and how much 
that team spent on the construction. Additionally, the venue dummy variable implies 
0=same venue, 1=renovation/reconstruction in that year, 2=new venue in that year. If 
construction occurred in an odd year, it is counted as the next even year, and for this 
analysis, since naming rights are not a measure of market being studied, venue name is 
only changed if the entire venue changed, not just if the sponsorship naming rights 
changed. FranchStartYr and FranchCurLocYr provide information on the age of the 
franchise and if that team relocated to the metropolitan area in which they currently reside. 
League dummy variables were created to show that holding all else constant, changes in 
the value of one league do not correspond to exactly the same changes in another league. 
For each league’s dummy, its value=1, or else the value=0. Lastly, a country dummy 
variable was created to control for the national location of a team, with 0=U.S. and 
1=Canada.  
Section 4.4: Specific Metropolitan Area and Other Notes from Final Dataset 
 For clarification and continuity purposes, there are some specific metropolitan area 
factors to note from the final dataset that could have an impact on the regression results. 
The Rams moves from St. Louis to Los Angeles for the 2016 season, which is indicated by 
                                               
6 Only one league/metropolitan area has 3 teams associated with it: NHL/New York, 
which includes the New York Islanders, New York Rangers, and New Jersey Devils 
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a change in the metropolitan area variables between the 2014 and 2016 data. San Francisco, 
Oakland, and Golden State teams have all been included under the same metropolitan area 
for all of those data observations, as well as Los Angeles and Anaheim being considered 
from the same metropolitan area. The Raiders are considered from Oakland for all data 
since they did not move to Las Vegas until the 2017 season7. The Current Location variable 
is defined at the metro area name, and not necessarily the location of the stadium or venue 
that the team plays in. The Florida Panthers are based in the Miami metro area. All teams 
in Arizona are based in the Phoenix metro area, while all teams in Colorado are based in 
the Denver metro area. The Indiana Pacers are considered from Indianapolis, the Carolina 
Panthers from Charlotte, but the Carolina Hurricanes from Raleigh. The Texas Rangers are 
grouped with all of the Dallas teams, the New England Patriots with all of the Boston 
teams, and the Tennessee Titans with the Nashville teams. The Utah Jazz are considered 
to be from Salt Lake City.  
 Figure 11 beow lists all of the professional sports teams that have been sold over 
the last decade, as well as corresponding estimated value for that sale year, real transaction 
price, and the difference in value between the two. Given the relatively wide range of 
differences in value between estimation and sale across the four leagues, it is fair to make 
a few assumptions about the buyer’s investment decision-making process, and how these 
decisions may have affected the overall market. First, it is fair to assume that, on average, 
investors have the necessary tools and data to determine the estimated value of the team 
prior to purchase, and thus will pay not beyond what economic theory would suggest as 
                                               
7 And 1995 for year in current location since they moved to Los Angeles for 15 years 
from 1980-1995 
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Section 4.5: Comparison of Estimated Values vs. Real Transaction Prices 
Figure 11: Estimated vs. Real Value Differences since 20088  
Team League Year Sold EV ($M) Sale Price ($M) Value Difference ($M) 
Los Angeles Clippers NBA 2016 $2,000 $2,000 $0 
Golden State Warriors NBA 2010 $315 $450 -$135 
Brooklyn Nets NBA 2010 $269 $365 -$96 
Toronto Raptors NBA 2012 $382 $400 -$18 
Washington Wizards NBA 2010 $313 $551 -$238 
Sacramento Kings NBA 2013 $525 $534 -$9 
Detroit Pistons NBA 2011 $360 $325 $35 
Atlanta Hawks NBA 2015 $825 $730 $95 
Memphis Grizzlies NBA 2012 $269 $377 -$108 
Charlotte Hornets NBA 2010 $278 $175 $103 
Philadelphia 76ers NBA 2011 $330 $287 $43 
Milwaukee Bucks NBA 2014 $405 $550 -$145 
New Orleans Pelicans NBA 2012 $285 $340 -$55 
Los Angeles Dodgers MLB 2012 $1,401 $2,000 -$599 
Chicago Cubs MLB 2009 $700 $700 $0 
Texas Rangers MLB 2010 $451 $593 -$142 
Houston Astros MLB 2011 $474 $465 $9 
San Diego Padres MLB 2012 $458 $600 -$142 
St. Louis Rams NFL 2010 $779 $750 $29 
Miami Dolphins NFL 2008 $1,044 $1,100 -$56 
Jacksonville Jaguars NFL 2012 $770 $770 $0 
Cleveland Browns NFL 2012 $987 $987 $0 
Buffalo Bills NFL 2014 $935 $1,400 -$465 
Montreal Canadians NHL 2009 $339 $575 -$236 
Toronto Maple Leafs NHL 2012 $1,000 $1,000 $0 
Dallas Stars NHL 2011 $230 $240 -$10 
Edmonton Oilers NHL 2008 $175 $170 $5 
Minnesota Wild NHL 2008 $217 $225 -$8 
New York Islanders NHL 2016 $385 $485 -$100 
                                               
8 For teams sold in odd years, estimated value was found on Forbes.com 
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Winnipeg Jets NHL 2011 $164 $170 -$6 
New Jersey Devils NHL 2013 $320 $320 $0 
St Louis Blues NHL 2012 $130 $180 -$50 
Tampa Bay Lightning NHL 2010 $145 $93 $52 
Buffalo Sabres NHL 2011 $173 $165 $8 
Arizona Coyotes NHL 2014 $225 $305 -$80 
Florida Panthers NHL 2013 $240 $160 $80 
 
fair value market price. This is in fact somewhat true, as the average buyer paid about $62 
million above estimated value at year of purchase.9 While $62 may seem like a large 
amount, it is small compared to teams now valued at and selling for over a billion dollars. 
Second, it is also fair to assume that transactions in which the buyer paid far beyond the 
estimated value10 were done so as a response to prior transactions in that respective league 
as well as hedging a bet that values would continue to rise over the long-term and turn it 
into a positive investment (which recent data would confirm was a good bet). Lastly, a 
large portion of the teams that sold below their estimated value are from small metropolitan 
areas11, meaning their potential for future growth is much more limited compared to that 
of a team from a large city such as New York or Los Angeles. 
Section 4.6: Descriptive Statistics Table 
 Table 1 below gives the unit, mean, and standard deviation for all 25 variables used 
in the regression analysis to follow. 
 
 
                                               
9 Calculated as a total value difference of $2,339 million/36 teams sold 
10 Examples include Washington Wizards (2010), Los Angeles Dodgers (2012) and 
Buffalo Bills (2014) 
11 Examples include Atlanta Hawks, Charlotte Hornets, Florida Panthers 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev 
Team Value $M 777.71 619.16 
Revenue $M 191.50 90.02 
OpInc $M 22.91 34.70 
WtpCost # 100.01 36.47 
PlayerExp $M 101.68 43.97 
MetroPop M 5.45 4.95 
MetroGDP USD 328680.80 324494.70 
MetroInc USD 58473.76 11917.79 
MetroTeams # 3.59 2.06 
MetroTeamsSame # 1.20 0.46 
YrPurchased Year 1993.44 19.08 
VenueYrOpened Year 1995.96 14.33 
VenueCap # 38606.60 22437.78 
VenueCost $M 271.53 240.58 
VenueD # 0.06 0.31 
CountryD # 0.07 0.26 
FranchStartYr Year 1957.34 32.29 
FranchCurLocYr Year 1966.25 30.06 
NBAD # 0.246 0.431 
NFLD # 0.262 0.440 
NHLD # 0.250 0.431 
MLB2016 # 0.049 0.216 
NBA2016 # 0.049 0.216 
NFL2016 # 0.053 0.223 
NHL2016 # 0.049 0.216 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 The following regressions and accompanying results will answer the proposed 
question of how market demographics and financial statistical can be determinants of the 
large rise in sports franchise values over the last decade. The dependent variable used in 
the regression analysis will be the estimated franchise value for a specific year (or range of 
years) as calculated by Forbes. The independent variables for this analysis will mostly 
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include the financial data provided by Forbes and relevant metropolitan area statistics, with 
other venue and team history factors used to provide additional information. The first 
regression, which looks at the effects of different metro area variables on team value, will 
be used as a comparison to previous studies conducted by economists on this subject. That 
will then be followed by a regression with strictly financial data obtained from Forbes, 
which represents the new aspect to this study as most other researchers did not have access 
to such data at the time of their studies. The third regression will combine both the metro 
area and financial data in order to see if the existence of variables in one category makes 
those in the other more or less significant. After that, a fourth regression will be run using 
all of the variables collected for the complete analysis of this study, such as team history 
and venue data. Even previously insignificant variables will be included in order to view 
the significance of the entire dataset as a whole. This regression will also act as the basis 
for the final regression, which will test the correlation of only the previously significant 
variables. All of the following regressions will have five other variables in common: 
@trend, year=2016, nbad, nfld, and nhld. The league dummy variables control for the fact 
that some leagues might be more popular than others, or perhaps more expensive. The 
year=2016 variable looks for the bubble in 2016, as shown in the background section for 
three of the four leagues, while the trend term is there to show that the bubble will not be 
found just because values are rising steadily over time. Additionally, one other regression 
will show the importance of the interaction terms for each league in regards to the franchise 
value bubble in 2016, which was more broadly defined in the first five regressions as the 
variable year=2016. 
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Section 5.1: Metropolitan Area Regression Results 
  Equation 1 regresses franchise value on metropolitan area demographics. 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽9∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽=∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 +∗ 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀 
The results from this first regression equation can be seen in Table 2 below. 
With t-statistics of -5.29 and 3.61 respectively, metroteamssame and metroGDP are the 
only two metro area demographic variables that are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. A coefficient of -266 implies that having multiple teams in the same 
metro area in the same league leads to a decrease in team value of around $266 million 
for each franchise. This makes sense theoretically as multiple teams will be competing 
for fans, players, and other sources of value that would otherwise be consumed by only 
one team in a different scenario. As one would expect, increased competition leads to a 
lower overall valuation as it decreases profits, ticket prices, and TV revenues, among 
 Table 2: Metropolitan Area Regression 
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     METROPOP -29.91507 23.16639 -1.291313 0.1971 
METROINC 0.001974 0.001681 1.174311 0.2407 
METROGDP 0.001289 0.000357 3.615587 0.0003 
METROTEAMS -7.936334 16.22787 -0.489056 0.6250 
METROTEAMSSAME -266.2864 50.29895 -5.294075 0.0000 
C 444.3843 117.7996 3.772377 0.0002 
@TREND 79.58225 13.34464 5.963613 0.0000 
YEAR=2016 473.0842 46.01912 10.28017 0.0000 
NBAD -136.9350 37.68255 -3.633910 0.0003 
NHLD -383.2890 37.72375 -10.16042 0.0000 
NFLD 678.7132 36.90319 18.39172 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.735111    Sum squared resid 61842969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.730689    F-statistic 166.2328 
S.E. of regression 321.3156    Durbin-Watson stat 0.593700 
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other things. Additionally, while metroGDP is significant and positively correlated, it has 
a very minimal effect on team value as a $1 increase in GDP leads to only a $1,300 increase 
in value. One variable that is not statistically significant but is interesting to note is that of 
metroteams. One would expect that having another team in the same metropolitan area but 
in a different sport would matter by bringing in more fans and revenue in general, but in 
this regression that is not the case. The trend and year variables are both statistically 
significant, implying that (1) there is an overall upward trend in team value over this ten-
year time period (as expected), and (2) that there is a substantial spike in values between 
2014-2016, which will be discussed in more detail in later regressions. The dummy 
variables are also statistically significant here, indicating that the value rise in teams from 
each sport are all independent of each other. Lastly, an R-squared value of 0.73 signifies 
that the independent variables, in general, are decently well-correlated to the dependent 
variable. 
Additionally, the results from this regression compare interestingly to those of 
previous analyses performed by economists on this topic. Most previous authors measured 
market size are metropolitan area population, which in this regression is insignificant, but 
will become significant in later regressions. This would support findings by both Alexander 
and Kern (2004) and Miller (2007) that suggest the size of the market, which can lead to 
many other changes, does have an impact on team value. However, beyond this many 
authors failed to examine the effects of metropolitan market measured as GDP or per capita 
income, multiple teams in the same market, or even the same market and the same league, 
which the rest of this analysis will dive into a bit further. 
 
   36 
Section 5.2: Financial Data Regression Results 
 The second regression estimating the impact of financial data on franchise value 
can be written as Equation 2: 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝+ 𝛽; ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽= ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑+ 𝜀 
The results from this second regression can be seen in Table 3 below. 
In terms of the financial data variables, revenue is the only statistically significant 
one that has an impact on team value. A coefficient of 6.9 implies that a $1 million rise in 
revenue corresponds to a $6.9 million increase in franchise valuation. Although the other 
three financial variables are insignificant, their coefficient signs are interesting to 
decipher as well. Holding all else constant, a higher operating income would lead to a 
decrease in franchise value of about $180,000. However, this is a bit surprising as one 
would expect more income to increase value, even if revenue does not change. Likewise,  
 Table 3: Financial Data Regression 
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REVENUE 6.901559 0.496529 13.89961 0.0000 
OPINC -0.179857 0.665891 -0.270099 0.7872 
WTPCOST -0.229019 0.213455 -1.072916 0.2837 
PLAYEREXP -1.158843 0.811176 -1.428596 0.1536 
C -685.6629 50.17387 -13.66574 0.0000 
@TREND -4.716575 8.032243 -0.587205 0.5573 
YEAR=2016 317.6174 27.13320 11.70586 0.0000 
NHLD 298.4850 29.89860 9.983244 0.0000 
NBAD 376.8908 26.88719 14.01748 0.0000 
NFLD 253.3025 26.88991 9.419983 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.912247    Sum squared resid 20487404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.910931    F-statistic 693.0451 
S.E. of regression 184.7855    Durbin-Watson stat 1.277253 
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the two cost variables – win-to-player cost and player expenses, both exhibit a negative 
relationship with team value. The negative coefficient on win-to-player cost implies that 
more wins per player payroll leads to a decrease in value. In the same sense, the negative 
beta on player expenses signifies the effect of spending more on players while holding 
revenue constant. As such, one would expect franchise values to decrease if strictly costs 
rise, but in this case that value is insignificant. However, the extra costs in both scenarios 
are recaptured by more value being given back to the franchise in terms of wins and 
popularity since better players are typically more expensive. While the trend variable is not 
significant (and is also negative) in this regression compared to the previous estimation, a 
bubble in 2016 still exists. Holding financials constant, team values are $317 million higher 
in 2016 than in other years. Additionally, compared to the previous regression in which the 
coefficients for the NBA and BFL dummy variables were negative and significant, here all 
three leagues are positive and high significant. Lastly, an R-squared value of 0.91 
compared to 0.73 implies much better correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables when using financial data rather than metropolitan area demographics. 
Section 5.3: Financial/Metro Combined Regression Results 
 The third regression looking at the impact of both financial data and metropolitan 
area demographics on franchise value can be estimated as Equation 3: 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝+ 𝛽; ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽= ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽C∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽--∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽-2 ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽-6 ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽-9 ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀 
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The results from the combined financial data/metropolitan area regression can be seen 
here in Table 4. 
 In combining the metro area and financial data, revenue is the most statistically 
significant variable, albeit now with a lower coefficient of 5.68 compared to 6.90 before. 
An extra $1 million of annual revenue raises team value by $5.68 million, on average. As 
in the previous regression, the other three financial variables remain insignificant. 
However, holding everything else constant, opinc and playerexp now exhibit positive 
coefficients, which would support that theories that higher income as well as spending 
more on better players would result in more wins, and thus a higher overall value. 
Metropop and metroGDP are both statistically significant now, though having multiple 
teams from the same league in the same metropolitan area is not. Every additional 1 
million people in a metropolitan area causes team value to decrease by $33 million,  
Table 4: Combined Financial Data/Metropolitan Area Regression 
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REVENUE 5.684286 0.533763 10.64945 0.0000 
OPINC 0.930116 0.685860 1.356130 0.1756 
WTPCOST -0.167591 0.208467 -0.803921 0.4218 
PLAYEREXP 0.044011 0.828362 0.053130 0.9576 
METROPOP -33.65539 13.15047 -2.559254 0.0107 
METROINC -0.000473 0.000956 -0.494423 0.6212 
METROGDP 0.000666 0.000205 3.253711 0.0012 
METROTEAMS 6.925519 9.131232 0.758443 0.4485 
METROTEAMSSAME -53.05130 29.26173 -1.812993 0.0703 
C -560.9873 81.51870 -6.881701 0.0000 
@TREND -2.648321 8.013926 -0.330465 0.7412 
YEAR=2016 321.0383 26.45309 12.13614 0.0000 
NBAD 334.7420 27.67817 12.09408 0.0000 
NFLD 263.9292 26.87076 9.822172 0.0000 
NHLD 248.2269 31.00651 8.005637 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.917412    Sum squared resid 19281564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.915469    F-statistic 472.1046 
S.E. of regression 180.0166    Durbin-Watson stat 1.324399 
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which supports the idea that more people does not necessarily mean a higher value – those 
people must be attracted by a winning team, or other external factors. Additionally, a $1000 
increase in metro area GDP results in only a $666 increase in team value. While significant, 
this value is almost negligent. The year and dummy variables remain highly significant and 
contribute substantially to increased valuations, further supporting the possibility of some 
other outside factor contributing to the large rise seen over the last decade. The year=2016 
variable supports the idea of a $321 million rise in team value, on average, between 2014 
and 2016. Lastly, an increase in R2 from 0.912 to only 0.917 between the previous 
regression and this estimation raises the correlation value between the independent and 
dependent variables only trivially, thus suggesting that most of the variation in the model 
is driven by the statistically significant financial variables. 
Section 5.4: Regression Using all Statistical Variables 
 In order to test the viability of all the variables from the dataset that have 5 years’ 
worth of observations, and subsequently determine which ones are viable for a “final” 
regression, a fourth equation estimated as Equation 4 and the corresponding regression  𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝+ 𝛽; ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽= ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽C∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽--∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽-2 ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽-6 ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽-9∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑦𝑟 + 𝛽-; ∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑟 + 𝛽-< ∗ 𝑦𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 +	𝛽-=∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +	𝛽-C ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 +	𝛽-E ∗ 	𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑑 + 𝛽2+ ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 +	𝛽2-∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 +	𝛽22 ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 	𝜀 
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results in Table 5 can be seen below. 
As expected, most of the other variables under the venue and franchise history 
categories added to this regression and not seen in any previous regression are insignificant 
with the exception of one: venueyropened. The implications for this variable state that, 
holding all else constant, for every year older a team’s venue is, its overall value decreases 
by about $2 million. This makes sense theoretically and is supported by previous research 
in this subject, in which both cases newer venues tend to increase value by attracting more 
fans and better talent, while older venues (or as venues age without receiving significant 
upgrades) with worse facilities will lead to a decrease in value. However, it is also 
Table 5: All Variables Regression 
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REVENUE 6.080535 0.551030 11.03485 0.0000 
OPINC 0.599888 0.695888 0.862047 0.3890 
WTPCOST -0.147999 0.213432 -0.693421 0.4883 
PLAYEREXP -0.619150 0.852670 -0.726130 0.4680 
METROPOP -39.68089 13.75140 -2.885588 0.0041 
METROINC -0.000870 0.000983 -0.885186 0.3764 
METROGDP 0.000798 0.000218 3.660146 0.0003 
METROTEAMS 1.794721 9.873663 0.181769 0.8558 
METROTEAMSSAME -70.79475 30.54979 -2.317357 0.0208 
VENUECAP -0.001165 0.001609 -0.724035 0.4693 
VENUECOST 0.008474 0.055351 0.153099 0.8784 
VENUED 43.01403 26.55857 1.619592 0.1059 
VENUEYROPENED -2.007373 0.689503 -2.911332 0.0037 
FRANCHCURLOCYR 0.634560 0.439965 1.442294 0.1498 
FRANCHSTARTYR -0.561133 0.444401 -1.262673 0.2072 
YRPURCHASED -0.498056 0.489959 -1.016527 0.3098 
@TREND -1.732899 8.119632 -0.213421 0.8311 
YEAR=2016 319.1849 26.45458 12.06539 0.0000 
COUNTRYD -16.68777 33.47822 -0.498467 0.6183 
NBAD 314.1889 46.71182 6.726111 0.0000 
NFLD 290.7501 50.44577 5.763617 0.0000 
NHLD 236.4433 48.22683 4.902734 0.0000 
C 4379.383 1676.448 2.612299 0.0092 
     
     R-squared 0.919582    Sum squared resid 18775119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916568    F-statistic 305.1055 
S.E. of regression 178.8431    Durbin-Watson stat 1.349812 
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     important to note that in some cases historical value of a venue might actually increase a 
team’s value (e.g. Fenway Park, Wrigley Field), though that significance goes largely 
uncaptured in this study except for the venue dummy variable. Even though it is 
insignificant in this regression, the venue dummy variable places a large value on a new 
venue (2), a medium value for a venue that was renovated sometime over this ten-year time 
period (1 – Madison Square Garden), and no value (0) for any team whose venue has not 
changed at all. Besides the year in which a venue was opened or renovated, theory and 
research support the fact that historical date variables do not have much impact on current 
data. As such, this leaves revenue, metropop, metrogdp, metroteamssame, year=2016, and 
the league dummy variables – along with venureyropened – as statistically significant for 
the final regression. 
 In order to determine that the rest of the variables from this regression were 
acceptable to drop for the final regression, performing an F-test will show that these 
variables are collectively insignificant. The results from this test can be seen in Table 6 
below. Given that the F value of 1.29 is less than the critical value of 1.73, it is acceptable  
 Table 6: All Variable Regression to Final Regression F-test 
Measure Value 
SSR-R 19312701 
SSR-UR 18775119 
N 610 
K-R 10 
K-UR 23 
F 1.29287569 
P 0.212142345 
CV 1.736843013 
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to drop all of the statistically insignificant variables from Equation 4 above in order to 
produce an adequately refined regression model that can be seen in Equation 5 to follow. 
Section 5.5: Statistically Significant Regression Results 
 Paring down the results from the previous regression containing all of the variables, 
one last regression was run using only those that were statistically significant in order to 
determine which factors can be attributed to the rise in franchise values over the last decade. 
The estimated equation can be seen at Equation 5 below, with the accompanying regression 
to follow in Table 7. 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽9∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽=∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 	𝜀 
 As expected, all of the variables in the final regression are significant at the 95% 
confidence level. Revenue represents the most strongly correlated variable with team value,  
 Table 7: Final Regression with Only Statistically Significant Variables 
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REVENUE 6.060637 0.159865 37.91098 0.0000 
METROPOP -31.04548 8.808430 -3.524520 0.0005 
METROGDP 0.000661 0.000140 4.725345 0.0000 
METROTEAMSSAME -60.24441 28.73619 -2.096465 0.0365 
VENUEYROPENED -1.418480 0.523988 -2.707088 0.0070 
YEAR=2016 312.7068 20.75446 15.06697 0.0000 
NBAD 364.8105 24.75419 14.73732 0.0000 
NFLD 272.6627 23.11592 11.79545 0.0000 
NHLD 281.8866 27.07524 10.41123 0.0000 
C 2178.750 1048.626 2.077719 0.0382 
     
     R-squared 0.917279    Sum squared resid 19312701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916038    F-statistic 739.2549 
S.E. of regression 179.4097    Durbin-Watson stat 1.332012 
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as a $1 million increase in revenue leads to a $6.1 million rise in team value. Although one 
would expect metropolitan population to have a positive coefficient, here it is negative. 
This implies that for every additional 1 million people in a metro area, team values fall by 
about $31 million. Having multiple teams from the same league in the same metro area is 
also negatively correlated, though this was expected as competition will force fans to 
choose a team, which, in theory, will drive down income, revenue, and overall value. Here, 
every additional team subtracts about $60 million from estimated value of each team in 
that same league and area. The year in which a venue opened is also negatively correlated 
with team value, exhibiting a decrease of $1.5 million for every additional year that a venue 
ages. While metropolitan area GDP is positively significant, the coefficient value is almost 
negligible. A $1,000 rise in GDP only increases team value by about $660. The league 
dummy variables are all highly significant with large coefficients as well, further 
supporting previous evidence that the rise in team value in each league is independent in 
terms of popularity, cost, or other factors. As for the year=2016 variable seen in all five 
regressions, the high coefficient value associated with the variable and its strong 
significance presents a more interesting case as to the exact causes of the recent spike in 
franchise values. In this regression, the coefficient of 312 corresponds to a rise in team 
value, on average, of $312 million between 2014-2016. One economic theory that could 
help explain this spike is that of the economic bubble theory. Clearly since 2014 there has 
been an irrational rise in values lying far outside the “true” range of asset values throughout 
the professional sports industry, although less-so in the NHL than in the other three leagues. 
The existence of this trend term helps control for the fact that assets such as professional 
sports franchises have a long history of increases in value, but cannot act as a 20- or 30-
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year bubble because bubbles do not last that long. As such, this variable provides evidence 
that team values grew even above the trend in 2016. Part of this bubble can also be 
explained by the mirrored rise in TV and broadcasting revenue – a major source of revenue 
for the leagues as a whole and teams individually. Big market teams such as New York and 
Los Angeles will reap the rewards of large contracts, while smaller-market teams still 
benefit through league revenue-sharing models. Another contributing factor lies in the 
combination of interest in professional sports, especially as a long term investment, and a 
lack of supply since teams rarely hit the market. 
Section 5.6: 2016 Bubble Regression 
 Given that the year=2016 variable showed a large and statistically significant spike 
in franchise values for all of the previous regressions, further analysis aimed to investigate 
whether this phenomenon occurred in all four sports leagues between 2014-2016, and if 
so, which leagues were impacted more than others, holding all else constant. In order to 
estimate that impact, four interaction terms that define teams in each league based strictly 
on 2016 values were added to the final regression estimation (except for the year=2016 
term), as seen in Equation 6 below. 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽9∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑚𝑙𝑏2+-< + 𝛽=∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙_2016 + 𝛽-- ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎_2016+ 𝛽-2 ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙_2016 + 	𝜀 
Table 8 shows the corresponding results. 
As the results from the below regression show, large and significant bubbles were present 
in the MLB, NFL, and NBA for 2016, while a relatively small and insignificant rise existed 
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in the NHL. MLB teams averages a rise in value of about $251 million between 2014-2016, 
while NFL team values rose about $490 million, and NBA team values an astounding $548 
million over that same time period. Meanwhile, NHL teams averaged only about an $11 
million increase in team value during this two-year timeframe – a small enough increase 
that it was not significant in regards to the theory of an economic bubble. The remainder 
of the variables were relatively unaffected in coefficient value or sign even when adding 
these interaction terms, indicating that, all else constant, they are all still significant for 
both the 2014-2016 bubble as well as the entire 10-year period analyzed in this study. 
An F-test was also performed to show that, in contrast to the previous test where it 
was acceptable to drop all of the insignificant variables from the “all” to “final” regression, 
here none of the variables between the 2016 bubble regression and final regression can be 
 Table 8: 2016 Bubble Regression 
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REVENUE 5.787318 0.148359 39.00881 0.0000 
METROPOP -35.53321 7.812326 -4.548352 0.0000 
METROGDP 0.000759 0.000125 6.094275 0.0000 
METROTEAMSSAME -70.76478 25.46535 -2.778866 0.0056 
VENUEYROPENED -1.475897 0.463686 -3.182965 0.0015 
MLB_2016 251.5094 33.95766 7.406558 0.0000 
NFLD 242.9708 21.99456 11.04686 0.0000 
NBAD 283.0595 23.55686 12.01601 0.0000 
NHLD 300.4416 25.33241 11.85997 0.0000 
NFL_2016 489.3740 35.47452 13.79508 0.0000 
NBA_2016 548.3236 32.91345 16.65956 0.0000 
NHL_2016 11.06986 32.77372 0.337766 0.7357 
C 2370.940 928.3333 2.553975 0.0109 
     
     R-squared 0.935634    Sum squared resid 15027401 
Adjusted R-squared 0.934340    F-statistic 723.1730 
S.E. of regression 158.6554    Durbin-Watson stat 1.284077 
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 Table 9: 2016 Bubble Regression to Final Regression F-test 
Measure Value 
SSR-R 19312701 
SSR-UR 15027401 
N 610 
K-R 10 
K-UR 13 
F 56.74798323 
P 2.7654E-32 
CV 2.619828457 
 
dropped. In comparison to the previous F-test that produced an acceptable result, here an 
F-value of 56.74 that is much larger than the critical value of 2.61 implies that it is not 
acceptable to think that the bubble is the same in all of the leagues. This result of this test 
does, in fact, support the regression results from Table 8 as a bubble only exists in 3 out of 
the 4 leagues, and the coefficient value for each of the league_2016 variables exhibit a 
different value increase during this year. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Section 6.1: Summary of Findings 
 As a result of this study, I discovered that revenue, metropolitan area population 
and GDP, the year that a venue was opened or renovated, and having multiple teams in the 
same metropolitan area are all correlated with team franchise value. Revenue and metro 
are GDP were both positively correlated, as expected, while venue year, same metropolitan 
area/teams, and metro area population were all negatively correlated – the former two 
which were expected while the latter was not. More specifically, these results answer the 
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question of how financial data can be an indicator of the recent spike in franchise 
valuations, with revenue increases acting as the main driver. One of the major reasons 
behind the recent rise in revenues that will continue into the foreseeable future is the rights 
fees to televise live sporting events (Adgate 2018). Despite declining television ratings, 
analysts expect media rights to surpass gate receipts as the largest source of revenue during 
this current year, with the rise of streaming services helping to offset this decline in TV 
viewership. Additionally, and potentially much more interesting in terms of the economics 
behind these results, the regression analysis supported the previously stated background 
information that the rise in team values suggests some type of economic bubble in 
professional sports valuations since 2014. On average, franchises from the four major 
sports leagues rose by $316 million between 2014-2016. However, as seen in the final 
regression looking at the size of the bubble in each league specifically for 2016, the value 
presents a much wider range of results. NHL teams rose by only $11 million on average – 
not exhibiting any bubble at all – while MLB teams rose $251 million, NFL teams $490 
million, and NBA teams $548 million on average. Clearly, the factors affecting each league 
cause them to act independently of one another. While there are potentially many different 
explanations behind the growth of this bubble, given the formation and exclusivity of the 
professional sports industry, it does not seem to be in danger of bursting anytime soon like 
previous economic bubbles such as the dotcom boom, and more recently, the housing 
crisis. 
Section 6.2: Suggestions for Future Research 
Given additional time and resources, it is interesting to consider how this study can 
be improved upon in future research. In looking at the slopes of the lines for the background 
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graphs in Chapter 2, one could hypothesize that bubble started between 2012-2014 rather 
than 2014-2016 – at least for teams in the NBA and NHL. Testing this hypothesis using a 
year=2014 variable could provide further insight into both the factors contributing to the 
bubble as well as potentially how long the bubble might last considering that bubbles 
typically do not exist for more than a decade at most. Further evidence that supports this 
bubble theory recently became available with the release that every NBA team is now 
worth at least $1 billion as of 2018, which continues the sharp rise in values since 2014. 
This represents a 22% rise year-over-year, with the largest driving forced being the league’s 
international growth prospects (Badenhausen, 2018). Not only has the influx of 
international talent from Europe and elsewhere broadened the NBA’s appeal, but so has the 
league’s investment in itself by playing games in other countries and forming NBA China 
– a development program in one of the world’s largest markets. It is arguable that the NBA 
now has the greatest international appeal of all four major North American sports leagues. 
Additionally, domestic growth has surged with a new TV broadcasting deals set to begin, 
the ability to advertise on uniforms, and an overall increase in merchandise sales. However, 
the regressions in this study control for revenue from these and other sources, meaning 
these factors are likely causing the rise in the revenue variable but not in the bubble, unless 
they are having some type of speculative effect that is unsustainable in the long run. 
As a result of this study, it is interesting to consider how estimated franchise values 
as well as real transaction prices will continue this upward trend in the coming years, and 
at what pace they will do so. While revenue is certainly a strong variable to use in 
forecasting the future, there must be other explanations as well. Beyond the variables used 
in this analysis, another possibility for future study based on these recent findings could be 
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the impact of outside factors such as broadcasting-specific revenue variables and 
international attraction on team value, potentially measured in viewership or otherwise.  
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